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Abstract: Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises 
increase cooperation in laboratory experiments.  This has been taken as evidence for internal 
motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping. The original goal of this 
paper was to examine promises under a double blind payoff procedure to test the alternative 
explanation that promise keeping was due to external influence and reputational concerns.  We 
find no evidence that communication increases the overall level of cooperation in our double 
blind experiment.  However, our results are due in part to the high level of cooperation that we 
observe, leading us to conduct additional single blind conditions.  Ultimately, we find no 
evidence that communication or payoff procedures impact aggregate cooperation.          
JEL classification: C70; C91 
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Anecdotal and scientific evidence suggest that promises – commitments to perform a certain 
action – are a powerful tool in increasing levels of cooperation.
1  What makes people keep their 
promises and why do their recipients trust them? In a widely cited paper, Charness and 
Dufwenberg (2006, p. 1579; hereafter C&D) argue that “The evidence is consistent with people 
striving to live up to others’ expectations so as to avoid guilt.” Drawing upon the literature on 
psychological game theory (Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2008), C&D (p. 
1579) model, “A guilt-averse player [as one who] suffers from guilt to the extent he believes he 
hurts others relative to what they believe they will get. Therefore, he is motivated by his beliefs 
about others’ beliefs.” Thus, guilt aversion is an internal influence not reliant on external 
enforcement.  Other explanations such as lie aversion and preference for promise keeping (see 
e.g. Braver, 1995; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Gneezy, 2005; Demichelis and Weibull, 
2008; Kartik, 2009; Miettinen, 2008; Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992; Sutter, 2009; 
Vanberg, 2008) have been forwarded as well, but these explanations are also based upon 
internal motivation.   
 
To test the conjecture that promise keeping is driven by guilt aversion, C&D employ a game 
with hidden action.  While C&D provide evidence that promises strengthen beliefs about one’s 
cooperation and that these promises are often kept, their experimental design also allows for 
an alternative explanation. In particular, their experiments were conducted using a standard 
single-blind (or low social distance) protocol in which the players did not know the identity of 
their counterpart, but the experimenter did. Further, the experimenter could observe both the 
message and the act before paying the participant in person. Therefore, the C&D experiments 
as well as follow up studies by Vanberg (2008) and Ellingsen, et al. (2010) cannot distinguish 
whether the observed behavior is due to an internal motivation such as guilt or lie aversion or 
due to external influences acting through shame or reputational concerns.    
                                                           
1 See e.g. Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), Kerr 
and Kaufmann-Gilliland (1994), Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Sally (1995), Servátka, Tucker, and Vadovič, 
(2011). The distinction between internal and external motivations for behavior is potentially quite 
important for extrapolating to behavior outside the lab.  Previous research with related games 
has shown that subjects often behave differently when the experimenter can identify who took 
which action (single-blind) as compared to when the experimenter cannot (double-blind).
2 
Hoffman et al. (1996) found that dictators acted in a far more selfish manner under double-
blind procedures than under any of the other treatments they considered. Cox and Deck (2005) 
report the results of a binary trust game using both single- and double-blind procedures.  With 
single-blind procedures, they replicate the results of McCabe and Smith (2000) that 
approximately 75% of second movers are trustworthy. However, under double-blind 
procedures only 25% of the subjects are trustworthy.  Such a radical change in behavior clearly 
demonstrates the impact that observability by the experimenter may have on behavior where 
trust is involved.
3   
 
Guilt aversion, lie aversion and preference for promise keeping predict no difference in 
communication effects on cooperation under single-blind and double-blind procedures since 
they all rely on internal motivation, making the presence of a third party irrelevant. However, if 
people are mainly motivated by reputational concerns, aversion to shame and/or other 
external influences, then observability by a bystander might have profound implications on 
their behavior and on communication itself.  To determine if behavior observed in C&D is due 
to internal or external factors, we conduct a series of experiments using the hidden action trust 
game of C&D with and without messages using a double-blind procedure.  The design of those 
experiments is presented in section 2.  As a prelude to the results, which are presented in 
section 3, we find evidence suggesting that messages are not effective at increasing 
cooperation when behavior is not observable.  However, the level of cooperation we observe is 
                                                           
2 Single-blind refers to the anonymity between the subjects whereas double-blind refers to the anonymity 
between subjects and between the subjects and the experimenter.  This terminology differs from other disciplines 
such as the medical field where double-blind is taken to mean that the experimenter does not know to which 
treatment an experimental unit is assigned.  For this reason, in the literature the procedures we use are sometimes 
referred to as single anonymous and double anonymous, respectively.   
3 A recent paper by Barmettler, et al.  (2011) has questioned the appropriateness of the experimental designs in 
previous studies comparing double-blind and single-blind payoff procedures.  Based upon experiments reported in 
that paper, the authors argue that payoff procedures do not affect behavior to the degree previously believed.  quite high leading us to conduct additional experiments using a single-blind protocol as 
described in section 4.  Rather than replicating previous results, we find 1) no evidence that 
messages increase cooperation under this protocol and 2) no evidence that the payoff 
procedures impact cooperation in this game.  Section 5 looks at the effects of specific types of 
messages, with the main result being that promises and non-promise messages are correctly 
interpreted as signals of trustworthiness. A final section contains concluding remarks.   
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES FOR DOUBLE BLIND EXPERIMENTS 
 
C&D introduce a simple hidden action trust game.  In this game Player A can choose Out 
yielding both players $5.  Alternatively, A can choose In, in which case Player B determines both 
players’ payoffs.  If B chooses Don’t Roll then A earns $0 and B earns $14.  If B chooses Roll then 
B earns $10 and A earns $0 if a die roll ends up on 1 and earns $0 otherwise.  The payoff 
structure is shown in Table 1.  Critically, both players know that the action of B is never directly 
revealed to A.   Thus, A cannot determine if a $0 payoff is due to B’s selfish act or bad luck.   
 
Table 1.  Hidden Action Trust Game as Shown to Subjects 
  A Receives  B Receives 
A chooses OUT  $5  $5 
A chooses IN, B chooses DON’T ROLL   $0   $14 
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL, die = 1   $0   $10 
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL, die = 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6   $12   $10 
 
 
To investigate the power of messages, C&D compare treatments in which prior to A making a 
decision, the matched B either can or cannot send a message to A.  The result is that in the 
absence of messages 44% of B s act cooperatively while 67% active cooperatively when 
messages can be sent, a statistically significant difference (p-value = 0.037).    
 
Our study explores whether people keep promises due to social or reputational concerns, 
stemming from the fact that the experimenters themselves observed both the messages that 
were sent and the actions that were actually taken. In an attempt to rule out this social enforcement explanation, we conducted a between subjects experiment with and without 
messages similar to those of C&D except that we implement a double-blind payoff procedure.
4   
 
As subjects entered the lab, they drew slips indicating if they were in the A role or B role.  Bs sat 
in the back half of the lab and As sat in the front half of the lab.  Each person was seated at an 
individual workstation with privacy dividers.  Instructions were then handed out and all 
questions were answered publicly.
5  The payoff procedure was explained in the experiment 
instructions to subjects in the Message Condition as follows, with a similar statement for the No 
Message Condition.     
 
Each of you will receive a “code.” The code will be written on your response form.  The 
purpose of this code is so that the experimenters can insure that any message sent by B is 
received by the paired A. The code also allows the experimenters to insure that your 
payoff is based on your action and the action of the person with whom you are paired 
while maintaining that no participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom 
he or she is paired. 
 
The code you receive will also be on a “key.”   After the experiment is completed, you 
will be able to receive your cash payment in a sealed envelope from a locked mailbox, 
located in another room here in the lab.  The envelopes will be identical on the outside, 
so that no one, including the experimenter, will ever know the decision, message, or 
payoff of any participant.  To protect your anonymity, you should place the coded key in 
your pocket once you receive it.  After you have collected your payoff envelope, there will 
be a container into which everyone will drop their keys.            
 
 
After the instructions were completed, a large curtain was partially drawn so that everyone 
could verify the procedures while visually separating the two types.  Identical envelopes with 
coded mailbox keys and coded response forms were placed in a large box and taken around the 
B half of the lab.  Subjects drew out a single envelope, but waited to open it until the 
experimenters had returned to the A side.  In the No Message Condition, B subjects made their 
                                                           
4 While C&D also elicit subjects’ beliefs (in order to test for guilt aversion), we do not include such elicitation in our 
experiment as our main focus is on internal vs. external enforcement of promises rather than testing guilt aversion 
under double-blind procedures or discriminating between various models of internal motivation. 
5 Appendix 1 contains the experiment instructions. decisions, placed the mailbox key in their pocket, and then returned the response form into the 
envelope.  In the Message Condition, B subjects also wrote a message to A in the provided 
space if they so chose before placing their form back in the envelope.  After Bs finished, they 
dropped their envelopes back into the large box.   
 
In the Message Condition, the completed envelopes from Bs were then shuffled and opened in 
view of both groups, but from a distance that ensures no subject could see the decisions on the 
forms.  Messages were cut off from the B forms, and stapled to coded response forms for As.  
The forms were then placed in envelopes along with a coded mailbox key.  As then selected an 
envelope from a box of envelopes and waited for the experimenters to return to the B side 
before opening the envelopes, placing the keys into their pockets, making their decisions, and 
returning the forms into the envelopes.  In the No Message Condition, B envelopes were left 
sealed and As selected an envelope from a box of envelopes containing mailbox keys and 
response forms.  As in the other condition, they waited for the experimenters to return to the B 
side before opening the envelopes, placing the keys into their pockets, making their decisions, 
and returning the forms into the envelopes.  When everyone was done, the experimenters 
determined the payoffs for each player
6, placed the money in plain envelopes, and placed the 
envelopes in the coded mailboxes in another room in the lab.  Subjects privately opened their 
mailboxes, collected their earnings envelopes, and left the lab.                         
 
A total of 186 undergraduate students participated in this study at the Behavioral Business 
Research Laboratories at the University of Arkansas. Participants received a $5 participation 
payment in addition to their salient earning from the game. 
 
                                                           
6 Following C&D, the subjects were informed in advance that a die would be rolled for each pair regardless of what 
actions were actually taken so that one could not infer what actions had been taken from the noise.   3. DOUBLE BLIND EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
 
Table 2 compares behavior between our two double-blind conditions.  The percentage of As 
who choose In is similar in both conditions (60% in the No Message Condition and 64% in the 
Message Condition, p-value = 0.689).
7  The striking feature is that the percentage of Bs who 
choose Roll is virtually indistinguishable between two conditions:  67% versus 68% (p-value =0 
.877).  These results suggest that messages do not impact behavior with a double blind 
protocol, thus calling into question that internal motivation, be it guilt aversion, preference for 
promise keeping or some other factor, is driving the results that have been reported previously.   
 
Table 2.  Observed Aggregate Behavior and Comparison Between Double-Blind Conditions  
 




z-statistic  p-value 
Percent of As 
Choosing In 
60% (=29/48)  64% (=29/45)  0.401  0.689 
Percent of Bs 
Choosing  Roll 
67% (=32/48)  68% (=30/44)   0.155  0.877 
One subject in B role did not make a choice to Roll or Don’t Roll in the Message Condition. 
 
 
If we had observed relatively low levels of cooperation by Bs, then our findings regarding the 
impact of communication would also be consistent with the previous literature on double blind 
payoff procedures:  observation by the experimenter leads to more pro-social behavior as 
compared to the data in C&D.  However, this is not what we find.  The frequency of choosing 
Roll by Bs in both our double blind Message Condition and No Message Condition is the same 
as the 67% observed by C&D in their single blind with messages sessions and significantly 
higher than the 44% that they observe without messages (which is an upper bound on what we 
anticipated finding a priori).   
 
4. INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPACT OF MESSAGES IN SINGLE BLIND EXPERIMENTS 
 
One possible explanation for the lack of difference in cooperation levels in our experiment and 
that of C&D is that subject pool differences may be driving the behavior.  If our subject pool is 
                                                           
7 A two sample proportion test is the same as chi-squared test when there are only two categories.   relatively more cooperative than the one used by C&D then the similarity in cooperation 
between our Message Condition and theirs despite the difference in the payoff procedure 
could be a simple coincidence.  If a smaller social distance influences subjects to act in a more 
pro-social way, we might find even higher rates of cooperation in single-blind Message 
Condition using our subject pool.  Such a finding would confirm our conclusion in the previous 
section that messages need external verification to be effective.  Therefore, we conducted 
additional experiments following a single blind procedure to explore this possibility and provide 
a replication of C&D.
8   
 
Before describing the results from the single blind conditions, we consider the implications of 
some other possible outcomes from our replication.  We might find substantially more 
cooperation both with and without messages in our single-blind replication suggesting that 
messages are not effective in increasing cooperation regardless of their observability.  Such a 
finding would be consistent with Ellingsen, et al. (2010) who find little evidence to support guilt 
aversion.
 9 While such a result would be inconsistent with C&D, it would be consistent with the 
behavioral literature comparing double-blind and single-blind procedures.  Another possibility, 
suggested by Barmettler, et al.  (2011), is that we find no difference between double-blind and 
single-blind procedures meaning cooperation remains at two-thirds in both single-blind 
conditions.  Alternatively, we could replicate the level of cooperative behavior observed in C&D 
suggesting messages are effective when external observability is possible.  Although, if we do 
replicate such behavior, it would suggest that a double-blind procedure with no messages 
actually leads to greater cooperation in this setting, a result that would be puzzling.  Of course, 
observed behavior might not fit any of these cases.            
 
As argued by Barmettler, et al. (2011) previous comparisons between single-blind and double-
blind procedures tend to emphasize the payoff procedures in double-blind, but not single-blind.  
                                                           
8 The replication is not perfect as the lab facility, appearance of the experimenters, time of day, and countless 
other factors differ between the studies.  
9 In a separate paper Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) report that the effect of messages may not be robust as 
they fail to replicate their previous results when only certain predetermined messages are permissible.   This asymmetry may create a demand effect for the subjects and encourage people to act more 
selfishly in double-blind experiments (see Zizzo, 2010 for a discussion of experimenter demand 
effects).  Therefore, we are careful to keep the attention paid to the payoff procedures similar 
between our single-blind and double-blind experiments.  It is worth noting that emphasizing 
the connection between one’s actions and one’s identity may create a demand effect for more 
cooperative behavior and thus differences between our two payoff procedures may be greater 
than if we followed the typical procedure for single-blind experiments of leaving the payoff 
process opaque.  For the Message Condition in the single-blind protocol, the text describing the 
payoff procedure was changed to the following.     
     
Each of you will receive a “code.” The code will be written on your response form.  The 
purpose of this code is so that the experimenters can insure that any message sent by B is 
received by the paired A. The code also allows the experimenters to insure that your 
payoff is based on your action and the action of the person with whom you are paired 
while maintaining that no participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom 
he or she is paired. 
 
The code you receive will also be on a “key.”   After the experiment is completed, each 
person will be called by name to collect their money.  You will be able to receive your 
cash payment from the experimenter by privately showing your key to the experimenter 
so the experimenter knows how much money you earned.  At this point your earnings will 
be recorded beside your name on the sign-in sheet you already completed.   
 
A similar change in the instructions was made for the No Message Condition.  In all other 
respects our single-blind procedures were identical to the double-blind procedures described 
above including the drawing of roles, the envelope procedures, and subjects receiving their 
earnings in an adjoining room.         
 
A total of 106 new subjects were recruited from the same subject pool as the used for the 
double-blind experiments to participate in these conditions,
10 the results of which are reported 
in Table 3.    
 
                                                           
10 The lab maintains a database of approximately 2000 volunteers.   Table 3.  Observed Aggregate Behavior and Comparison Between Single-Blind Conditions  
 




z-statistic  p-value 
Percent of As 
Choosing In 
75% (=18/24)  76% (=22/29)  -0.073  0.942 
Percent of Bs 
Choosing  Roll 
63% (=15/24)  64% (=18/28)  -0.133  0.894 
 
 
Based on the data in Table 3, we find no evidence that messages affect behavior using a single-
blind procedure for players in either role (p-values = 0.942 and 0.894 for As and Bs, 
respectively).   That is, we do not replicate the effectiveness of messages reported in C&D.  
While we observe similar behavior in the Message Condition as that reported by C&D (p-values 
= 0.845 and 0.838 for As and Bs, respectively), we observe a marginally higher frequency of 
choosing In and Roll than they report (one sided p-values = 0.056 and 0.077 for As and Bs, 
respectively).
11  Further, the behavior is similar to that which we observed in the double-blind 
procedure (p-values = 0.300 and 0.732 for As and Bs respectively with messages and p-values = 
0.220 and 0.726 for As and Bs respectively without messages).  That is, consistent with 
Barmettler, et al. (2011) and contrary to previous research, we do not find any effect of social 
distance on cooperation whether communication is possible or not.    
 
5. THE IMPACT OF MESSAGE TYPE ON BEHAVIOR 
 
Up to this point, we have focused on the aggregate effect of B having the opportunity to send a 
message to A.   We now turn to the specific content of the messages, which are shown in 
Appendix 2 for both our double-blind and single-blind sessions.  To evaluate each we employed 
                                                           
11 For this comparison we use one-sided test due to the fact that our main reason for running the single-blind 
replication of C&D is that our No Message double-blind session generated more cooperation than their No 
Message single-blind condition.  In all other comparisons we simply report two sided p-values because the two 
items being compared are so similar nominally.  Strictly speaking, the tests between the Message and No 
Messages conditions have one-sided alternative hypotheses that Messages increase cooperation, but reporting 
one-sided tests are deemed unnecessary given the overwhelming lack of significance in the two-sided tests.       three coders to rate each message as being a promise, a non-promise message, or blank.
12   The 
coders received the instructions for our double blind conditions, instructions on the coding 
procedure, and a typed transcript of the messages.  Coders went through each message 
individually and were paid $20 for the task.  Our coders also went through the relevant 
messages from C&D.  This allows us to make a direct comparison about the effectiveness of 
messages in the three cases without introducing variation due to the way coders interpret 
messages.  While our coders generally agreed with the evaluations in C&D there were some 
differences, as indicated in Appendix 2.  In the remainder of the paper, all references to 
message types are based upon the opinions of our coders and we restrict attention to cases 
where our coders had unanimous agreement.  Table 4 evaluates behavior conditional on 
message type across the three message conditions.    
            
Table 3.  Behavior Conditional on Message Type 
 
  Our Double-Blind  Our Single-Blind  C&D Single-Blind 
Message 
Type 
Promise  Blank  Other  Promise  Blank  Other  Promise  Blank  Other 
Percent of 
Messages 
24%  48%  29%  35%  44%  22%  64%  11%  25% 
A In  8  9  9  8  5  4  20  1  6 
A Out  2  11  3  0  5  1  3  3  3 
Percent of As 
choosing In 
80%  45%  75%  100%  50%  80%  87%  25%  67% 
B Roll  8  9  10  4  5  3  17  3  5 
B Don’t Roll  1  11  2  3  5  2  6  1  4 
Percent of Bs 
choosing Roll 
90%  45%  83%  57%  50%  60%  74%  75%  56% 
We exclude observations for which the three coders did not agree.  Assigning the observed behavior according 
to the majority opinion of the message type does not substantially change the results.  In subject pairs in which 
one of the players did not make a move, the player who did act is included in this analysis as long as the 
message was unambiguous to the coders.    
 
 
                                                           
12 Houser and Xiao (2011) point out that the researcher coding in C&D is potentially problematic and employ a 
coordination game to evaluate subjects’ messages.  While Houser and Xiao’s method has its advantages, previous 
literature on communication uses third party coders to analyze content (see for example Neuendorf, 2002).  The results in Table 3 reveal several interesting patterns.  First, we do not see any evidence that 
subjects who make promises are more likely to be choose Roll as compared to those who send 
non-promise messages (74% versus 56%, p-value = 0.314) or do not send messages at all (74% 
versus 75%, p-value = 0.963) in the C&D data.  Our single blind replication finds the same 
pattern, albeit with small sample sizes (57% versus 60%, p-value = 0.921 and 57% versus 50%, 
p-value = 0.772, respectively).  While, we do find that a promise increases the likelihood that B 
will play cooperatively as compared to a blank message (90% versus 45%, p-value = 0.026), the 
effect holds for non-promise messages relative to blank messages as well (83% versus 45%, p-
value = 0.033) and there is no difference in behavior based upon whether the message is a 
promise or not (90% versus 83%, p-value = 0.719).  
 
What we do find is that As believe that Bs will keep their promises.  In all three cases the 
percentage of As choosing In is greatest after receiving a promise and is statistically deferent 
from when no message is received (80% versus 45%, p-value = 0.068 in our double-blind 
condition; 100% versus 50%, p-value = 0.019 in our single-blind condition; 87% versus 25%, p-
value = 0.006 in C&D).  However, non-promise messages are not viewed differently than 
promises in any of the three cases (80% versus 75%, p-value = 0.781 in our double-blind 
condition; 100% versus 80%, p-value = 0.188 in our single-blind condition; 87% versus 67%, p-
value = 0.186 in C&D).          
 
Although there is not much difference in behavior between the three conditions conditional on 
message type
13, there appears to be a substantial difference in the types of messages that are 
sent.  In both our single-blind and our-double blind sessions, the modal message type was blank 
whereas the modal message type in C&D was a promise.  A test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the distribution of message types is the same in the three cases (
2 [4 d.f.] = 16.727, p-value = 
0.002).  Casual inspection of the messages (see Appendix 2) also suggests that messages tended 
to be longer in C&D than in our study.      
 
                                                           
13 In fact, no pairwise comparison of A or B behavior conditional on message type between any two of the three 
data sets is statistically significantly.   6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Recently, researchers have been focusing on how communication in general and promises in 
particular can lead to cooperative outcomes in laboratory experiments.  For example, C&D 
conduct an innovative experiment to explore guilt aversion as modeled using psychological 
game theory.  While they report behavior consistent with people keeping promises because of 
an internal motivation to not let others down, their experimental design leaves open the 
alternative explanation that behavior is driven by reputational concerns.  In fact, current 
conventional wisdom based upon laboratory evidence suggests subject observability by the 
experimenter leads to more cooperative behavior than under “double-blind” procedures.   
 
We set out with a simple experimental design, a variation of C&D with and without the 
possibility of sending messages, to test if promises were effective in increasing cooperation in a 
double-blind environment.  We found that the ability to send messages did not increase 
cooperation, suggesting the effectiveness of promises is due to reputational concerns that can 
be enforced by an observer (experimenter).   This result is not surprising given the existing 
literature on double-blind versus single-blind environments; however, what we do find 
surprising is the considerable amount of cooperation under our double-blind procedures.  In 
fact, we found as much cooperation as C&D found in their single-blind study.   
The high level of cooperation that we observed in our original design led us to conduct two 
additional conditions (single-blind payoff procedures with and without messages) ultimately 
yielding a complete 2x2 design.  The observed behavior in the single-blind conditions was 
similar to what we found in our double-blind conditions.  Thus, based upon our four conditions 
we conclude that the ability to send messages does not improve aggregate trustworthiness, 
contrary to previous findings.  We also conclude that the double-blind or single-blind payoff 
procedure does not impact behavior, contrary to previous findings but consistent with recent 
work by Barmettler, et al. (2011).  Like Barmettler, et al. (2011) we take special care to place 
comparable emphasis on the payoff procedure in both cases, as opposed to previous studies 
which have tended to focus subject attention on the payoff procedures only in the double-blind 
payoff procedure.            One possible way to explain our findings is that the incremental effects on cooperation of 
things like messages and observability are decreasing in the overall level of cooperation.  That 
is, the level of trustworthiness that we observe in the double-blind, No Message condition may 
already be so high (67%), that there is not much room for messages or single-blind payoff 
procedures to increase it.  Why we observe so much cooperation in the double-blind, No 
Message condition is an open question as compared to C&D, but one possible explanation is 
subject pool differences.  We have at least some evidence of such differences based upon the 
messages that are sent.  While behavior is similar in our study and in C&D conditional on 
message type, we find relatively fewer subjects actually sending messages in our study.  This 
pattern is consistent with their subjects (correctly) anticipating little cooperation in the absence 
of messages and ours (correctly) anticipating relatively high levels.  
 
We feel that our paper highlights at least two important areas for further scientific 
investigation.  First, it is important to explore the robustness of experimental results regarding 
the impact of messages.   While we do not replicate the behavior of C&D this could be due to 
direct subject pool differences, diminishing returns to cooperation enhancing devices, sampling 
error, or some yet unidentified factor.  More evidence and replication is required before we can 
confidently distinguish between a corroborated conclusion and either type-1 or type-2 
statistical error.  Second, the issue of double-blind versus single-blind payoff procedures needs 
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 Appendix 1:  Subject Instructions 
The base instructions for the double-blind No Message condition.  Text in --( )—and  --[ ]--
highlight changes made for conditions with messages and single-blind conditions, respectively.   
  
INSTRUCTIONS 
Thank you for participating in this session. The purpose of this experiment is to study 
how people make decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask us questions as they arise, 
by raising your hand. Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment. 
You will receive $5 for participating in this session. You may also receive additional 
money, depending on the decisions made (as described below). Upon completion of the session, 
this additional amount will be paid to you (as described below). 
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will 




In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B. The 
amount of money you earn depends on the decisions made in your pair.  
On the designated decision sheet, each person A will indicate whether he or she wishes to 
choose IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, A and B each receive $5. We will collect these sheets 
after the choices have been indicated. Next, each person B will indicate whether he or she wishes 
to choose ROLL or DON’T ROLL (a die). Note that B will not know whether A has chosen IN 
or OUT; however, since B’s decision will only make a difference when A has chosen IN, we ask 
B’s to presume (for the purpose of making this decision) that A has chosen IN. 
If A has chosen IN and B chooses DON’T ROLL, then B receives $14 and A receives $0. 
If B chooses ROLL, B receives $10 and a six-sided die is rolled to determine A’s payoff. If the 
die comes up 1, A receives $0; if the die comes up 2–6, A receives $12. (All of these amounts 
are in addition to the $5 show-up fee.) This information is summarized in the chart below: 
 
  A Receives  B Receives 
A chooses OUT  $5  $5 
A chooses IN, B chooses DON’T ROLL   $0   $14 
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL, die = 1   $0   $10 




           --(                                                      A Message 
 
Prior to the decision by A concerning IN or OUT, B has an option to send a message to 
A. Each B receives a blank sheet, on which a message can be written, if desired. We will allow 
time as needed for people to write messages, then these will be collected. Please print clearly if 
you are B and you wish to send a message to A. 
In these messages, no one is allowed to identify him or herself by name or number or 
gender or appearance. (The experimenter will monitor the messages. Violations, as determined 
by the experimenter, will result in B receiving only the $5 show-up fee, and the paired A 
receiving the average amount received by other A’s.) Other than these restrictions, B may say 
anything that he or she wishes in this message. If B does not wish to not send a message, B 





Each of you will receive a “code.” The code will be written on your response form.  The 
purpose of this code is --(so that the experimenters can insure that any message sent by B is 
received by the paired A. The code also allows the experimenters)-- to insure that your payoff is 
based on your action and the action of the person with whom you are paired while maintaining 
that no participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is paired 
The code you receive will also be on a “key.”   After the experiment is completed, you 
will be able to receive your cash payment in a sealed envelope from a locked mailbox, located in 
another room here in the lab.  The envelopes will be identical on the outside, so that no one, 
including the experimenter, will ever know the decision --(, message, )-- or payoff of any 
participant.  To protect your anonymity, you should place the coded key in your pocket once you 
receive it.  After you have collected your payoff envelope, there will be a container into which 
everyone will drop their keys.            
--[         The code you receive will also be on a “key.”   After the experiment is completed, each 
person will be called by name to collect their money.  You will be able to receive your cash 
payment from the experimenter by privately showing your key to the experimenter so the 
experimenter knows how much money you earned.  At this point your earnings will be recorded 
beside your name on the sign-in sheet you already completed.                                     ]-- 
 
 You have the role of A          Your code___________ 
 
 
Please circle your choice of (1) IN or (2) OUT and then place this form back in the envelope.  




A receives $0 & B receives $14 if B chooses DON’T ROLL  
A receives $0 & B receives $10 if B chooses ROLL & die = 1 








A receives $5 & B receives $5 
  
You have the role of B          Your code___________ 
 
 
Please circle your choice of (1) DON’T ROLL or (2) ROLL and then place this form back in the 
envelope. You must circle exactly one choice. 
 
 
(1) DON’T ROLL 
 
A receives $5 & B receives $5 if A chooses OUT  








A receives $5 & B receives $5 if A chooses OUT  
A receives $0 & B receives $10 if A chooses IN and B chooses ROLL & die = 1 




 You have the role of B          Your code___________ 
 
 
Please circle your choice of (1) DON’T ROLL or (2) ROLL and then place this form back in the 
envelope. You must circle exactly one choice. 
 
 
(1) DON’T ROLL 
 
A receives $5 & B receives $5 if A chooses OUT  








A receives $5 & B receives $5 if A chooses OUT  
A receives $0 & B receives $10 if A chooses IN and B chooses ROLL & die = 1 




The experimenter will cut this page along the dashed line and only the bottom portion 
will be sent to A, if you choose to send a message.  Place an “X” in the provided space if you do 
not wish so send a message to A.     
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 





 Appendix 2:  Coder Instructions and Subject Messages  
 
a/b in the Code column denotes that the three coders wee split and that two coded the 
messages as a and 1 coded the message as b.  In the table with the messages from Charness 
and Dufwenberg (2006), an * denotes that a majority of our coders evaluated the message 
differently than did C&D.  
 
Coder Instructions 
Purpose: To study how communication affects the play of the game. 
Game: Refer to the attached instructions for the experiment. 
 
Coding Rules: 
(1) The unit of observation is a single message. 
(2) If a message contains the relevant category of content, enter the appropriate category code.   
“0” a blank message 
“1”  a promise or statement of intention of the action the message’s sender will take  
(The senders actions are limited to Roll and Don't Roll) 
“2”  a message that is not blank, but does not contain a promise or statement of 
intention of the action the messenger’s sender will take.   
 (3) You should independently code all messages. Do not discuss with anyone about which 
statements should fall into which categories. 
(4) Your job is to capture the content of the message as sent rather than why it was sent or 
what effect it had. Think of yourself as a “coding machine.”   
 
You will be paid $20 for coding all messages. Thank you. Messages in Our Double-Blind Condition 
ID  B action  A action  Code  Message 
1  Roll  In  1 
I'm Going to choose to roll.  You have a one in six chance of 
making 12.  Like me, if your in this study, you probably need the 
money.  Choose IN, I guess you can't Tell but I'm not trying to 
decieve you. 
2  Roll  Out  0 
 
3  -  In  1 
I will not choose the Don't Roll option so feel free to go with the 
5/6 odds for the dice roll. 
4  Roll  Out  2  Your move 
5  Roll  In  2/1 
If you pick "in" every time, and I pick roll every time we will both 
win the highest amount of money safely.  For every 6 rolls if you 
pick in you have a 1/6 chance of getting $0 & a 5/6 Chance of 
getting $12.00.  It's in our best interest to pick "in" and Roll every 
time. 
6  Roll  In  1 
Look, we'll both make a lot more money if you go in and I roll 
every time.  I will roll every time, so if you go in we'll both make 
off pretty good. 
7  Roll  Out  2 
There is more of a chance for both of us to make more if you 
always choose in,  Odds are in both our Favors iF you choose in. 
8  Don't Roll  Out  0 
  9  Don't Roll  Out  0 
  10  Don't Roll  In  1  I'm In it to Roll with it. 
11  Roll  In  2 
Trust me and choose to roll to be in.  It is the best odds for both of 
us, even if you make more money 
12  Don't Roll  In  2 
I' am B and I wish to send a message to A.  You should Roll choose 
in 
13  Roll  Out  0 
  14  Roll  In  2  Stay In 
15  Roll  In  0 
  16  Don't Roll  Out  0 
 
17  Roll  In  1 
I chose to roll the die.  Gives you a 83% chance at $12 extra 
dollars if you want to go IN. 
18  Roll  In  0 
  19  Roll  In  1  I chose to roll 
20  Don't Roll  In  0 
  21  Roll  In  2  Choose IN - You won't be sorry. 
22  Roll  Out  0 
 
23  Roll  In  1 
PLEASE choose "IN" because I am choosing to "ROLL" - this is the 
best option for both of us together. 
24  Roll  In  0 
  25  Roll  In  2  INNER 
26  Don't Roll  Out  0 
 
27  Roll  Out  1 
If you choose In, I'll choose roll.  Gives us both to make more 
money, which seems fair.  Go Team! 
28  Roll  In  0 
 29  Don't Roll  Out  0 
  30  Roll  In  2  Choose In 
31  Don't Roll  Out  0 
  32  Don't Roll  In  0 
  33  Don't Roll  In  0 
  34  Roll  In  1/2  Lets Roll 5/6 chance of making more money 
35  Roll  In  1  I CHoSE To RoLL. 
36  Roll  In  0 
  37  Don't Roll  Out  0 
  38  Roll  In  2  IN 
39  Roll  Out  2 
If you choose to go in, we can both walk away with something 
hopefully! 
40  Roll  In  0 
 
41  Roll  In  1/2 
If you are willing to take a 5/6 chance of getting more than 5, I'm 
in. 
42  Roll  In  2 
There is no good or evil.  Only power, and those too weak to seak 
it. 
43  Don't Roll  Out  0 
  44  Roll  Out  1  Hi!  Im choose Roll 
45  Don't Roll  In  2  Hey buddy, I think should choose IN because 
 
 
Messages in Our Single-Blind Condition 
ID  B action  A action  Code  Message 
1  Roll  In  2  THE CHANCES ARE WORTH IT TO BE "IN". 
2  Roll  Out  0 
 
3  Roll  In  2 
Choose In the chances are higher to for positive gains than none. 
5 5/6 for gain. You've got nothing to lose. 
4  Roll  Out  0 
  5  Roll  Out  2  IN (***triple underlined***) 
6  Don't Roll  In  0 
  7  Roll  In  1  You better have chosen IN, because I'm rolling a 6 baby! 
8  Don't Roll  In  0 
  9  Roll  In  0 
 
10  Don't Roll  In  1 
Choose IN I will choose Roll You have a 5 in 6 chance of getting 
$12 dollars.  I'm happy with getting $10. 
11  Roll  In  1  I promise to select Roll 
12  Don't Roll  Out  0 
  13  Don't Roll  In  2  good luck :)  let's do it. 
14  Roll  In  1 
I am going to roll everytime.  Every thing will be ***single 
unknown scratched out character*** okay. 
15  Roll  In  2/1  Choose IN, we'll both win. 16  Don't Roll  In  0 
  17  Roll  In  2/1  I want to maximize our shared profit :) 
18  Roll  In  1/2 
If you choose "IN" and I choose "Roll" the most money will be 
aquired for the both of us. 
19  Roll  In  1  Roll 
20  Roll  Out  0 
  21  Don't Roll  In  0 
 
22  Roll  In  1/2 
im down to pick roll if you want to pick in.  Doesn't matter to me. 
:) <-- helps us both? 
23  Don't Roll  In  1  I will roll no matter what you may choose. 
24  Roll  In  2/1 
I'm not greedy, I'm choosing the option to get the most for both 
of us. 
25  Roll  Out  0 
 
26  Don't Roll  In  2 
Choose IN and we will both have A better chance of making more 
money.  Obviously. 
27  Roll  Out  2/1  Go IN, your chances at $12 is 5/6! 
28  Don't Roll  In  1 
Okay, the best choice for both of us looks like if you choose In.  
That way you have a 5/6 chance of getting $12 and I am happy 
with $10.  If you chose IN I will choose ROLL. 
29  -  In  1 
Choose IN, Either way I am going to Roll the die thus I will either 
get 1 or 2,3,4,5,6  The chane of us getting more $ is greater if we 




Relevant Messages in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)  




Code  Message 
1  Don't Roll  Out  2  2  Please choose In so we can get paid more.  
2  Don't Roll  In  1  1 
Choose in, I will roll dice, you are 5/6 likely to get 2,3,4,5, 
or 6 → $12. This way both of us will win something.  
3  Don't Roll  In  2  2 
If you stay in, the chances of the die coming up other than 
1 are 5 in 6 – pretty good. Otherwise, we’d both be stuck 
at $5. (If you opt out)  
4  Roll  Out  2  2 
I have to do laundry tonight and I really don’t want to do 
it! But I don’t have any clean underwear left and I don’t 
want to go commando tommorrow. We’ll see what I 
decide tonight. This man acts funny doesn’t he? But he 
seems cool, he’s quite a character. All this mystery is 
kinda cool.  
5  Roll  In  1  1 
If you will choose “In”, I will choose to roll. This way, we 
both have an opportunity to make more than $5! J  
6  Roll  Out  0  0   7  Roll  In  1/2  1 
If I roll a 2-6 (you’ll know when you receive the $, you will 
give $5.00 to a stranger. [[[then there is a line, under 
which is written “Sign here if you are so kind]]]  Thanks. 
You’ll still be gaining more than if I had chosen Don’t roll.  
8  Roll  In  1  1 
The fairest thing to do is if you opt “IN”. Then I will 
proceed to choose “roll.” That way you and I have 5/6 
chances to make money for the both of us. That’s much 
better than just making $5 each. Increases both our 
chances. Thanks.  
9  Don't Roll  In  1  1  Choose In and I will Roll You have my word  
10  Roll  In  2  2 
Good luck I do not know what I’m going to do, so I have 
no hints on how to advise you on choosing “in” or “out.” 
Though it would be beneficial for me to pick don’t roll and 
hope you pick “in”, I also like to give you a chance to gain 
some cash. Who knows?  
11  Don't Roll  In  2/1  2 
What’s up? Good luck on your decision. Choose whatever. 
If you choose “out,” you get only $10 total. If you choose 
“In,” you can get $17 total instead of only $10. 7 bucks is 
a lot of money!  
12  Don't Roll  In  1  1 
Hey. OK I think that the best way for both of us to make a 
profit is for you to choose IN and for me to roll. That way 
we both make some money. There’s no point in me not 
rolling because that would give you and me less profit. So 
I’m a roller if you’re in J   
13  Roll  In  2  2  take a risk  
14  Roll  Out  1*  2 
If you choose IN the first round and then I will choose 
Don’t Roll at first. I will get $14 but then after that I will 
choose roll each time after the 1st role. Chances are most 
likely you will get $12 and I will get only $10. I will the 
only take 7 rolls for you to get even with me. That way we 
both leave with a good amount of money. Hope you have 
a great evening and that this works out for both of us. J   
15  Roll  In  1  1 
If you choose in I’ll roll.  Why? If you choose out, we walk 
out with $10 each. If you choose IN & I choose IN then 
both of us coin. So it’s a compromise. By agreeing to this I 
guarantee myself more $ than risking you choose out. So 
if you choose out I get $10 ($5 diff.) if you choose in I get 
$15 vs. $19 ($4 diff.). that’s why  
16  Don't Roll  Out  0  0   
17  Roll  Out  0  0   
18  Roll  In  2/1*  1 
Choose “In” so we can both make some $$ What are the 
chances me rolling a 1? I’ll try my best.  
19  Roll  Out  1  1  I’m going to roll.  
20  Roll  In  1  1  I’ll choose roll.  
21  Don't Roll  In  1  1  I will choose roll.  
22  Roll  In  1  1  I’m going to choose roll  
23  Roll  In  1  1  choose in, & I’ll roll.  
24  Roll  In  1  1 
You can have the 2 extra dollars. I’ll be nice and choose to 
roll. J  25  Roll  In  0  0   
26  Don't Roll  In  1  1 
Hey, choose in and I will roll. You have to like your odds 
that I will roll a 2,3,4,5, or 6. 5/6 odds ain’t bad.  
27  Roll  In  1  1 
If you choose “In”, I’ll choose Roll and you’ve got a 5/6 
chance of getting $12.  
28  Roll  In  2  2  Stay IN, I really need the money.  
29  Don't Roll  Out  2/1  2 
If you choose IN, and I roll, the chances of our getting the 
most $ are very high. The likelyhood of my rolling a 1 is 
small compared to the chances of rolling a 2-6. So we 
both get cash.  
30  Roll  In  1  1 
Hi, well I’m going to Roll so you have at least a shot for 
more money. I hope it works out.  
31  Don't Roll  Out  1/2*  2  Hopefully I’ll make a lucky role.  
32  Roll  In  1  1 
It’s much more likely that I’ll roll a 2-6 and thus get more 
money then if we don’t roll or choose out. I promise that I 
won’t cheat you and that I’ll choose to roll. J 
33  Roll  Out  2  2 
Tee hee, this is kinda Twilight Zone – ism; Why not “go for 
it”, eh? I hope you have a lovely evening as well.  
34  Roll  In  1/2*  2 
Hello fair stranger, anonymous partner … Choose 
whatever you want. Far be it from me to influence your 
decision, but I think you should choose “in” and I should 
choose “roll” and we should take the chance at both 
earning as much as we can. 5 chances out of 6 say it’ll 
work, and I’m totally broke, looking to rake in stray cash 
however I can. I feel the luck in the air.  I don’t really have 
much else to say. Hope you’re doing well, whoever you 
are.  Yes. That’s all. Random note from random human  
35  Don't Roll  In  2  2  Both of ‘us’ can earn.  
36  Roll  In  1  1 
Ok. You’re probably thinking, lets chose out, and I’ll at 
least get 5 bucks. But… …Chose ‘IN’, and I WILL chose to 
roll. The probability that I will roll a 2,3,4,5, or 6 is pretty 
high, and I think worthy of trying for. (I have no way of 
assuring you that I will roll … but, its probably worth going 
for, you’ll get $12 for finding out, where I could get $10.) 
x. I WILL ROLL  
37  Roll  In  1  1 
I will roll, so if you stay in, you’ve got a 5/6 chance of 
getting 12. If you don’t mind the risk, if you stay in we’ll 
both probably get more than $5 … Pretty cool to get 
money, eh? I’m kinda bored. Hope you’ve had a great day 
so far! My country Tis of Thee Sweet Land of Liberty Of 
Thee I sing. Land where my fathers died Land of the 
Pilgrim’s Pride On every mountainside Let freedom ring.  
George W. Bush wants you to go in! Bin Laden says “out”! 
☺  
38  Don't Roll  In  1  1 
Lets together get the most $ out of this that we can. --
>you 12    0    0    5 me 10   10  14   5 I promise not to do 
this one. ^ I promise I will choose to roll. You can have the 
extra $2 bucks. It’s good karma.      Thanks. I will choose 
ROLL in any case considering I will get the same amount 
no matter what you choose, as long as you choose IN. 
please excuse the awful handwriting. I’m trying  39  Roll  In  1  1 
I’m choosing ROLL, which gives you a chance to get $12 
instead of $5, so stay. It’s a risk, but you could end up 
getting a lot more.  
40  Roll  In  1  1 
If you choose in then I’m going to choose roll. This gives 
you a 5/6 chance of getting 12 dollars. That is 7 more than 
if you choose out. Since the money is free anyway – why 
not believe me. I’m don’t lie – I promise I will choose roll.  
41  Don't Roll  In  2  2 
If you choose IN you have the best opportunity to make 
the most money. You have a 5/7 chance of making more 
money! So IN would be your best bet. Cheers. ☺  
42  Roll  Out  1  1  Choose IN. I promise I’ll ROLL.  
 